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Abstract
This thesis describes and evaluates a market-making algorithm for set-
ting prices in financial markets with asymmetric information, and ana-
lyzes the properties of artificial markets in which the algorithm is used.
The core of our algorithm is a technique for maintaining an online prob-
ability density estimate of the underlying value of a stock. Previous the-
oretical work on market-making has led to price-setting equations for
which solutions cannot be achieved in practice, whereas empirical work
on algorithms for market-making has focused on sets of heuristics and
rules that lack theoretical justification. The algorithm presented in this
thesis is theoretically justified by results in finance, and at the same
time flexible enough to be easily extended by incorporating modules
for dealing with considerations like portfolio risk and competition from
other market-makers. We analyze the performance of our algorithm ex-
perimentally in artificial markets with different parameter settings and
find that many reasonable real-world properties emerge. For example,
the spread increases in response to uncertainty about the true value of
a stock, average spreads tend to be higher in more volatile markets,
and market-makers with lower average spreads perform better in envi-
ronments with multiple competitive market-makers. In addition, the
time series data generated by simple markets populated with market-
makers using our algorithm replicate properties of real-world financial
time series, such as volatility clustering and the fat-tailed nature of
return distributions, without the need to specify explicit models for
opinion propagation and herd behavior in the trading crowd.
Thesis Supervisor: Tomaso Poggio
Title: Eugene McDermott Professor
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the last decade there has been a surge of interest within the finance
community in describing equity markets through computational agent
models. At the same time, financial markets are an important applica-
tion area for the fields of agent-based modeling and machine learning,
since agent objectives and interactions tend to be more clearly defined,
both practically and mathematically, in these markets than in other
areas. In this thesis we consider market-making agents who play im-
portant roles in stock markets and who need to optimize their pricing
decisions under conditions of asymmetric information while taking into
account other considerations such as portfolio risk. This setting pro-
vides a rich and dynamic testbed for ideas from machine learning and
artificial intelligence and simultaneously allows one to draw insights
about the behavior of financial markets.
1.1 Background
The important concepts presented and derived in this thesis are drawn
from both the finance and artificial intelligence literatures. The set
of problems we are studying with respect to the dynamics of market
behavior has been studied in the market microstructure and artificial
markets communities, while the approach towards modeling financial
markets and market-making presented here is based on techniques from
artificial intelligence such as non-parametric probability density estima-
tion and multi-agent based simulation.
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1.1.1 Market Microstructure and Market-Making
The detailed study of equity markets necessarily involves examination
of the processes and outcomes of asset exchange in markets with explicit
trading rules. Price formation in markets occurs through the process
of trading. The field of market microstructure is concerned with the
specific mechanisms and rules under which trades take place in a market
and how these mechanisms impact price formation and the trading
process. O’Hara [23] and Madhavan [21] present excellent surveys of
the market microstructure literature.
Asset markets can be structured in different ways. The simplest
type of market is a standard double auction market, in which compet-
itive buyers and sellers enter their prices and matching prices result in
the execution of trades [13]. Some exchanges like the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) employ market-makers for each stock in order to
ensure immediacy and liquidity. The market-maker for each stock on
the NYSE is obligated to continuously post two-sided quotes (a bid
quote and an ask quote). Each quote consists of a size and a price,
and the market-maker must honor a market buy or sell order of that
size (or below) at the quoted price, so that customer buy and sell or-
ders can be immediately executed. The NYSE employs monopolistic
market-makers. Only one market-maker is permitted per stock, and
that market-maker is strictly regulated by the exchange to ensure mar-
ket quality. Market quality can be measured in a number of different
ways. One commonly used measure is the average size of the bid-ask
spread (the difference between the bid and ask prices). An exchange like
the NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation System) allows multiple market-makers for each stock with
less regulation, in the expectation that good market quality will arise
from competition between the market-makers1.
Theoretical analysis of microstructure has traditionally been an im-
portant part of the literature. Models in theoretical finance share some
important aspects that we use throughout this thesis. For example,
the ability to model order arrival as a stochastic process, following
Garman [14] and Glosten and Milgrom [15], is important for the deriva-
tions of optimal pricing strategies presented here. The basic concepts
of how market-makers minimize risk through inventory control and how
this process affects prices in the market are also used in framing the
market-maker’s decision problem and deriving pricing strategies (see,
for example, Amihud and Mendelson [1]).
1A detailed exposition of the different types of market structures is given by
Schwartz [26].
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The main problem with theoretical microstructure models is that
they are typically restricted to simple, stylized cases with rigid as-
sumptions about trader behavior. There are two major alternative
approaches to the study of microstructure. These are the experimental
markets approach ([11, 17] inter alia) and the artificial markets ap-
proach ([7, 10, 25] inter alia). The work presented in this thesis falls
into the artificial markets approach, and we briefly review the artificial
markets literature.
1.1.2 Artificial Markets
Artificial markets are market simulations populated with artificially in-
telligent electronic agents that fill the roles of traders. These agents can
use heuristics, rules, and machine learning techniques to make trading
decisions. Many artificial market simulations also use an evolutionary
approach, with agents entering and leaving the market, and agent trad-
ing strategies evolving over time. Most research in artificial markets
centers on modeling financial markets from the bottom up as structures
that emerge from the interactions of individual agents.
Computational modeling of markets allows for the opportunity to
push beyond the restrictions of traditional theoretical models of mar-
kets through the use of computational power. At the same time, the
artificial markets approach allows a fine-grained level of experimental
control that is not available in real markets. Thus, data obtained from
artificial market experiments can be compared to the predictions of
theoretical models and to data from real-world markets, and the level
of control allows one to examine precisely which settings and conditions
lead to the deviations from theoretical predictions usually seen in the
behavior of real markets. LeBaron [18] provides a summary of some of
the early work on agent-based computational finance.
There are two major strands of research on agent-based modeling
of financial markets. The first of these focuses on the emergent prop-
erties of price processes that are generated by the markets. Typically,
the goal of research that follows this approach is to replicate observed
properties of financial time series in real markets. For example, the
recent paper of Raberto et al [25] follows this approach, implementing
simple traders who place limit orders, along with a model of opinion
propagation among agents in the Genoa Artificial Stock Market. The
results described by Raberto et al show that their model can capture
some features of real financial time series, such as volatility cluster-
ing and the leptokurtic distribution of returns. Lux [20] also obtains
leptokurtic return distributions in his model, which focuses on chaotic
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properties of the dynamical system derived from traders changing be-
tween chartist and fundamentalist trading strategies2.
The other strand of research in artificial markets focuses more on the
algorithms employed by individual traders. This strand attempts to un-
derstand the environments in which particular strategies are successful,
and the resulting implications for market design. Examples of research
that follow this pattern include the reinforcement-learning electronic
market-maker designed by Chan and Shelton [6], recent work in the
Genoa Artificial Market framework by Cincotti et al [8] that studies
long-run success of trading strategies, and the NASDAQ-inspired sim-
ulations of Darley et al [10].
There is a paucity of work on market-making in the artificial mar-
kets literature. Some simulations of the NASDAQ stock market have
been carried out, but none of them have focused on market-maker be-
havior or on adaptive agents [10, 4]. With the exception of the work of
Chan and Shelton mentioned above, most research on market-making
has been in the theoretical finance literature, such as the important
paper of Garman [14] which was among the first to explicitly for-
mulate the market-maker’s decision problem. Amihud and Mendel-
son [1] introduced inventory control considerations for market-making.
Glosten and Milgrom [15] solve the market-maker’s decision problem
under information asymmetry. This thesis extends theoretical mod-
els of market-making and implements them within the context of our
artificial market.
1.1.3 Multi-Agent Simulations and Machine Learn-
ing
From the perspective of computer science, both multi-agent based sim-
ulation and machine learning have increased their importance as sub-
fields of artificial intelligence over the last decade or so. As LeBaron [18]
points out, financial markets are one of the most important applications
for agent-based modeling because issues of price and information ag-
gregation and dissemination tend to be sharper in financial settings,
where objectives of agents are usually clearer. Further, the availability
of massive amounts of real financial data allows for comparison with
the results of agent-based simulations.
In general, work on artificial markets incorporates either learning
or evolution as a means of adding dynamic structure to the markets.
2Interestingly, Lux does not actually implement a multi-agent simulation, but
restricts his model to a level of simplicity at which he can model the entire market
as a system of nonlinear differential equations.
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In settings where the availability of information is a crucial aspect of
market dynamics, adaptive agents who can incorporate information
and learn from market trends become important players. For example,
techniques from classification [22] can be used to predict price move-
ments for chartist agents, and explicit Bayesian learning can be used by
decision-theoretic agents to incorporate all available information into
the decision-making process. Techniques for tracking a moving param-
eter [5, 3] are useful in estimating the possibly changing fundamental
value of a stock. The price-setting process of market-making essen-
tially forms a control layer on top of an estimation problem, leading to
tradeoffs similar to the exploration-exploitation tradeoffs often found
in reinforcement learning contexts [28]. Competitive market-making
poses its own set of problems that need to be addressed using game-
theoretic analysis and considerations of collaborative and competitive
agent behavior [12].
1.2 Contributions
The research described in this thesis serves as a bridge in the literature
between the purely theoretical work on optimal market-making tech-
niques such as the paper of Glosten and Milgrom [15], which we use for
the theoretical underpinnings of this work, and the more realistic exper-
imental work on market-making that has been carried out by Chan [7]
and Darley et al [10]. We derive an algorithm for price setting that is
theoretically grounded in the optimal price-setting equations derived
by Glosten and Milgrom, and generalize the technique to more realistic
market settings. The algorithm has many desirable properties in the
market environments in which we have tested it, such as the ability to
make profits while maintaining a low bid-ask spread.
The market-making algorithm presented in this thesis is flexible
enough to allow it to be adapted to different settings, such as monopo-
listic or competitive market-making settings, and extended with other
modules. We present extensive experimental results for the market-
making algorithm and extensions such as inventory control. We ana-
lyze the effects of competition, volatility and jumps in the underlying
value on market-maker profits, the bid-ask spread and the execution of
trades.
The data from simulations of markets in which market-makers use
the algorithms developed in this thesis yield interesting insights into the
behavior of price processes. We compare the time series properties of
the price data generated by our simulations to the known characteris-
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tics of such data from real markets and find that we are able to replicate
some important features of real financial time series, such as the lep-
tokurtic distribution of returns, without postulating explicit, complex
models of agent interaction and herd behavior3 as has previously been
done in the literature [20, 25]4.
1.3 Overview
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides necessary back-
ground information on market microstructure, introduces the market
model, and derives the equations for price setting that the main market-
making algorithm uses. It also presents in detail the cornerstone of the
market-making algorithm, a technique for online probability density es-
timation that the market-maker uses to track the true underlying value
of the stock.
Chapter 3 describes the practical implementation of the algorithm
by taking into account the market-maker’s profit motive and desire to
control portfolio risk. This chapter also presents empirical analysis of
the algorithm in various different market settings, including settings
with multiple competitive market-makers, and details the important
time series properties of our model. Chapter 4 summarizes the contri-
butions of this thesis and suggests avenues for future work.
3Some explicit models of herd behavior are presented in the economics literature
by Banerjee [2], Cont and Bouchaud [9] and Orle´an [24] inter alia.
4It is worth noting that the true value process can induce behavior (especially
following a jump) similar to that induced by herd behavior through informed traders
all buying or selling simultaneously based on superior information. However, the
mechanism is a much weaker assumption than the assumption of explicit imitative
behavior or mimetic contagion.
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Chapter 2
The Market-Making
Algorithm
2.1 Market Microstructure Background
The artificial market presented in this thesis is largely based on ideas
from the theoretical finance literature1. Here we briefly review some
of the important concepts. A stock is assumed to have an underlying
true value (or fundamental value) at all points in time. The price at
which the stock trades is not necessarily close to this value at all times
(for example, during a bubble, the stock trades at prices considerably
higher than its true value). There are two principal kinds of traders in
the market. Informed traders (sometimes referred to as fundamentalist
traders) are those who know (or think they know) the true value of the
stock and base their decisions on the assumption that the transaction
price will revert to the true value. Informed traders will try to buy
when they think a stock is undervalued by the market price, and will
try to sell when they think a stock is overvalued by the market price.
Sometimes it is useful to think of informed traders as those possess-
ing inside information. Uninformed traders (also referred to as noise
traders) trade for reasons exogenous to the market model. Usually they
are modeled as buying or selling stock at random (one psychological
model is traders who buy or sell for liquidity reasons). Other models
of traders are often mentioned in the literature, such as chartists who
attempt to predict the direction of stock price movement, but we are
1For a detailed introduction to the basic concepts of market microstructure see
Schwartz [26].
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Buy Orders Sell Orders
Size Price ($) Price ($) Size
x1 23.20 23.28 y1
x2 23.18 23.30 y2
x3 23.15 24.25 y3
x4 23.00
Figure 2.1: An example limit order book
not concerned with such models of trading in this thesis.
There are two main types of orders in stock markets. These are
market orders and limit orders. A market order specifies the size of
the order in shares and whether the order is a buy or sell order. A
limit order also specifies a price at which the trader placing the order
is willing to buy or sell. Market orders are guaranteed execution but
not price. That is, in placing a market order a trader is assured that
it will get executed within a short amount of time at the best market
price, but is not guaranteed what that price will be. Limit orders, on
the other hand, are guaranteed price but not execution. That is, they
will only get executed at the specified price, but this may never happen
if a matching order is not found.
A double auction market in the context of stocks can be defined as
a market in which limit orders and market orders are present and get
executed against each other at matching prices. The limit orders taken
together form an order book, in which the buy orders are arranged in
decreasing order of price, while the sell orders are arranged in increasing
order of price (see figure 2.1 for an example). Orders that match are
immediately executed, so the highest buy order remaining must have a
lower price than the lowest ask order remaining. Market orders, when
they arrive, are executed against the best limit order on the opposite
side. So, for example, a market buy order would get executed against
the best limit sell order currently on the book.
Double auction markets are effective when there is sufficient liquid-
ity in the stock. There must be enough buy and sell orders for incoming
market orders to be guaranteed immediate execution at prices that are
not too far away from the prices at which transactions executed re-
cently. Sometimes these conditions are not met, typically for stocks
that do not trade in high volume (for obvious reasons) and immedi-
ately following particularly favorable or unfavorable news (when every-
one wants to be either on the buy or sell side of the market, leading to
huge imbalances).
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Market-makers are traders designated by markets to maintain im-
mediacy and liquidity in transactions. Market-makers are obligated
to continuously post two-sided quotes (bid (for buying) and ask (for
selling) quotes) and honor these quotes. Apart from providing immedi-
acy and liquidity to order execution, market-makers are also expected
to smooth the transition when the price of a stock jumps dramati-
cally, so that traders do not believe they received unfair executions,
and to maintain a reasonable bid-ask spread. Exchanges with mo-
nopolistic market-makers like the NYSE monitor the performance of
market-makers on these categories, while markets like NASDAQ use
multiple market-makers and expect good market quality to arise from
competition between market-makers.
2.2 Detailed Market Model
The market used in this thesis is a discrete time dealer market with
only one stock. The market-maker sets bid and ask prices (Pb and Pa
respectively) at which it is willing to buy or sell one unit of the stock at
each time period (when necessary we denote the bid and ask prices at
time period i as P i
b
and P ia). If there are multiple market-makers, the
market bid and ask prices are the maximum over each dealer’s bid price
and the minimum over each dealer’s ask price. All transactions occur
with the market-maker taking one side of the trade and a member of
the trading crowd (henceforth a “trader”) taking the other side of the
trade.
The stock has a true underlying value (or fundamental value) V i at
time period i. All market makers are informed of V 0 at the beginning of
a simulation, but do not receive any direct information about V after
that2. At time period i, a single trader is selected from the trading
crowd and allowed to place either a (market) buy or (market) sell order
for one unit of the stock. There are two types of traders in the market,
uninformed traders and informed traders. An uninformed trader will
place a buy or sell order for one unit at random if selected to trade. An
informed trader who is selected to trade knows V i and will place a buy
order if V i > P ia, a sell order if V
i < P i
b
and no order if P i
b
≤ V i ≤ P ia.
In addition to perfectly informed traders, we also allow for the pres-
ence of noisy informed traders. A noisy informed trader receives a sig-
nal of the true price W i = V i + η˜(0, σW ) where η˜(0, σW ) represents a
sample from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2
W
. The
2That is, the only signals a market-maker receives about the true value of the
stock are through the buy and sell orders placed by the trading crowd.
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noisy informed trader believes this is the true value of the stock, and
places a buy order if W i > P ia, a sell order if W
i < P i
b
and no order if
P i
b
≤ W i ≤ P ia.
The true underlying value of the stock evolves according to a jump
process. At time i + 1, with probability p, a jump in the true value
occurs3. When a jump occurs, the value changes according to the
equation V i+1 = V i + ω˜(0, σ) where ω˜(0, σ) represents a sample from a
normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2. Thus, jumps in the
value can be more substantial at a given point in time than those in a
unit random walk model such as the one used by Chan and Shelton [6],
but the probability of a change in the true value in our model is usually
significantly lower than the probability of a change in the true value in
unit random walk models.
This model of the evolution of the true value corresponds to the
notion of the true value evolving as a result of occasional news items.
For example, jumps can be due to information received about the com-
pany itself (like an earnings report), or information about a particular
sector of the market, or even information that affects the market as a
whole. When a jump occurs, the informed traders are placed in an ad-
vantageous position. The periods immediately following jumps are the
periods in which informed traders can trade most profitably, because
the information they have on the true value has not been disseminated
to the market yet, and the market maker is not informed of changes in
the true value and must estimate these through orders placed by the
trading crowd. The market-maker will not update prices to the neigh-
borhood of the new true value for some period of time immediately
following a jump in the true value, and informed traders can exploit
the information asymmetry.
2.3 The Market-Making Algorithm
The most important feature of the market-making model presented in
this thesis is that the market-maker attempts to track the true value
over time by maintaining a probability distribution over possible true
values and updating the distribution when it receives signals from the
market buy or sell orders that traders place. The true value and the
market-maker’s prices together induce a probability distribution on the
orders that arrive in the market. The market-maker’s task is to main-
tain an online probabilistic estimate of the true value, which is itself a
moving target.
3p is typically small, of the order of 1 in 1000 in most of our simulations
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Figure 2.2: Example of the true value over time
Glosten and Milgrom [15] analyze the setting of bid and ask prices so
that the market maker enforces a zero profit condition. The zero profit
condition corresponds to the Nash equilibrium in a setting with com-
petitive market-makers (or, more generally in any competitive price-
setting framework [12]). Glosten and Milgrom suggest that the market
maker should set Pb = E[V |Sell] and Pa = E[V |Buy]. Our market-
making algorithm computes these expectations using the probability
density function being estimated.
Various layers of complexity can be added on top of the basic al-
gorithm. For example, minimum and maximum conditions can be im-
posed on the spread, and an inventory control mechanism could form
another layer after the zero-profit condition prices are decided. Thus,
the central part of our algorithm relates to the density estimation it-
self. We will describe the density estimation technique in detail before
addressing other possible factors that market-makers can take into ac-
count in deciding how to set prices. For simplicity of presentation, we
neglect noisy informed traders in the initial derivation, and present the
updated equations for taking them into account later.
2.3.1 Derivation of Bid and Ask Price Equations
In order to estimate the expectation of the underlying value, it is nec-
essary to compute the conditional probability that V = x given that a
18
particular type of order is received. Taking market sell orders as the
example:
E[V |Sell] =
∫
∞
0
x Pr(V = x|Sell) dx (2.1)
Since we want to explicitly compute these values and are willing to make
approximations for this reason, we discretize the X-axis into intervals,
with each interval representing one cent. Then we get:
E[V |Sell] =
Vi=Vmax∑
Vi=Vmin
Vi Pr(V = Vi|Sell)
Applying Bayes’ rule and simplifying:
E[V |Sell] =
Vi=Vmax∑
Vi=Vmin
Vi Pr(Sell|V = Vi) Pr(V = Vi)
Pr(Sell)
Since Pb is set by the market maker to E[V |Sell] and the a priori
probabilities of both a buy and a sell order are equal to 1/2:
Pb = 2
Vi=Vmax∑
Vi=Vmin
Vi Pr(Sell|V = Vi) Pr(V = Vi) (2.2)
Since Vmin < Pb < Vmax,
Pb = 2
Vi=Pb∑
Vi=Vmin
Vi Pr(Sell|V = Vi) Pr(V = Vi) +
2
Vi=Vmax∑
Vi=Pb+1
Vi Pr(Sell|V = Vi) Pr(V = Vi) (2.3)
The importance of splitting up the sum in this manner is that the
term Pr(Sell|V = Vi) is constant within each sum, because of the influ-
ence of informed traders. An uninformed trader is equally likely to sell
whatever the market maker’s bid price. On the other hand, an informed
trader will never sell if V > Pb. Suppose the proportion of informed
traders in the trading crowd is α. Then Pr(Sell|V ≤ Pb) =
1
2
+ 1
2
α and
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Pr(Sell|V > Pb) =
1
2
− 1
2
α. Then the above equation reduces to:
Pb = 2(
Vi=Pb∑
Vi=Vmin
(
1
2
+
1
2
α)Vi Pr(V = Vi) +
Vi=Vmax∑
Vi=Pb+1
(
1
2
−
1
2
α)Vi Pr(V = Vi)) (2.4)
Using a precisely parallel argument, we can derive the expression
for the market-maker’s ask price:
Pa = 2(
Vi=Pa∑
Vi=Vmin
(
1
2
−
1
2
α)Vi Pr(V = Vi) +
Vi=Vmax∑
Vi=Pa+1
(
1
2
+
1
2
α)Vi Pr(V = Vi)) (2.5)
2.3.2 Accounting for Noisy Informed Traders
An interesting feature of the probabilistic estimate of the true value
is that the probability of buying or selling is the same conditional on
V being smaller than or greater than a certain amount. For example,
Pr(Sell|V = Vi, Vi ≤ Pb) is a constant, independent of V . If we assume
that all informed traders receive noisy signals, with the noise normally
distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2
W
, and, as before, α is the
proportion of informed traders in the trading crowd, then equation
2.3 still applies. Now the probabilities Pr(Sell|V = Vi) are no longer
determined solely by whether Vi ≤ Pb or Vi > Pb. Instead, the new
equations are:
Pr(Sell|V = Vi, Vi ≤ Pb) = (1− α)
1
2
+ α Pr(η˜(0, σW ) ≤ (Pb − Vi))
(2.6)
and:
Pr(Sell|V = Vi, Vi > Pb) = (1− α)
1
2
+ α Pr(η˜(0, σW ) ≥ (Vi − Pb))
(2.7)
The second term in the first equation reflects the probability that
an informed trader would sell if the fundamental value were less than
the market-maker’s bid price. This will occur as long as W = V +
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η˜(0, σW ) ≤ Pb. Similarly, the second term in the second equation
reflects the same probability, except with the assumption that V > Pb.
We can compute the conditional probabilities for buy orders equiv-
alently:
Pr(Buy|V = Vi, Vi ≤ Pa) = (1− α)
1
2
+ α Pr(η˜(0, σW ) ≥ (Pa − Vi))
(2.8)
and:
Pr(Buy|V = Vi, Vi > Pa) = (1− α)
1
2
+ α Pr(η˜(0, σW ) ≤ (Vi − Pa))
(2.9)
We can substitute these conditional probabilities back into both the
fixed point equations and the density update rule used by the market-
maker. First of all, combining equations 2.3, 2.6 and 2.7, we get:
Pb = 2
Vi=Pb∑
Vi=Vmin
(
1
2
−
1
2
α+α Pr(η˜(0, σW ) ≤ (Pb−Vi)))Vi Pr(V = Vi)+
2
Vi=Vmax∑
Vi=Pb+1
(
1
2
−
1
2
α + α Pr(η˜(0, σW ) ≥ (Vi − Pb)))Vi Pr(V = Vi) (2.10)
Similarly, for the ask price:
Pa = 2
Vi=Pa∑
Vi=Vmin
(
1
2
−
1
2
α+α Pr(η˜(0, σW ) ≥ (Pa−Vi)))Vi Pr(V = Vi)+
2
Vi=Vmax∑
Vi=Pa+1
(
1
2
−
1
2
α + α Pr(η˜(0, σW ) ≤ (Vi − Pa)))Vi Pr(V = Vi) (2.11)
2.3.3 Approximately Solving the Equations
A number of problems arise with the analytical solution of these dis-
crete equations for setting the bid and ask prices. Most importantly,
we have not yet specified the probability distribution for priors on V ,
and any reasonably complex solution leads to a form that makes an-
alytical solution infeasible. Secondly, the values of Vmin and Vmax are
undetermined. And finally, actual solution of these fixed point equa-
tions must be approximated in discrete spaces. We solve each of these
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problems in turn to construct an empirical solution to the problem and
then present experimental results in the next chapter.
We assume that the market-making agent is aware of the true value
at time 0, and from then onwards the true value infrequently receives
random shocks (or jumps) drawn from a normal distribution (the vari-
ance of which is known to the agent). Our market-maker constructs a
vector of prior probabilities on various possible values of V as follows.
If the initial true value is V0 (when rounded to an integral value
in cents), then the agent constructs a vector going from V0 − 4σ to
V0+4σ−1 to contain the prior value probabilities. The probability that
V = V0 − 4σ + i is given by the ith value in this vector4. The vector is
initialized by setting the ith value in the vector to
∫
−4σ+i+1
−4σ+i
N (0, σ) dx
where N is the normal density function in x with specified mean and
variance. The reason for selecting 4σ as the range is that it contains
99.9% of the density of the normal, which we assume to be a reasonable
number of entries. The vector is also maintained in a normalized state
at all times so that the entire probability mass for V lies within it.
The fixed point equations 2.10 and 2.11 are approximately solved by
using the result from Glosten and Milgrom that Pb ≤ E[V ] ≤ Pa and
then, to find the bid price, for example, cycling from E[V] downwards
until the difference between the left and right hand sides of the equation
stops decreasing. The fixed point real-valued solution must then be
closest to the integral value at which the distance between the two
sides of the equation is minimized.
2.3.4 Updating the Density Estimate
The market-maker receives probabilistic signals about the true value.
With perfectly informed traders, each signal says that with a certain
probability, the true value is lower (higher) than the bid (ask) price.
With noisy informed traders, the signal differentiates between differ-
ent possible true values depending on the market-maker’s bid and ask
quotes. Each time that the market-maker receives a signal about the
true value by receiving a market buy or sell order, it updates the pos-
terior on the value of V by scaling the distributions based on the type
of order. The Bayesian updates are easily derived. For example, for
Vi ≤ Pa and market buy orders:
Pr(V = Vi|Buy) =
Pr(Buy|V = Vi) Pr(V = Vi)
Pr(Buy)
4It is important to note that the true value can be a real number, but for all
practical purposes it ends up getting truncated to the floor of that number.
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The prior probability V = Vi is known from the density estimate, the
prior probability of a buy order is 1/2, and Pr(Buy|V = Vi, Vi ≤ Pa)
can be computed from equation 2.8. We can compute the posterior
similarly for each of the cases.
An interesting note is that in the case of perfectly informed traders,
the signal only specifies that the true value is higher or lower than some
price, and not how much higher or lower. In that case, the update
equations are as follows. If a market buy order is received, this is a
signal that with probability 1
2
(1−α)+α = 1
2
+ 1
2
α, V > Pa. Similarly, if
a market sell order is received, the signal indicates that with probability
1
2
+ 1
2
α, V < Pb. In the former case, all probabilities for V = Vi, Vi > Pa
are multiplied by 1
2
+ 1
2
α, while all the other discrete probabilities are
multiplied by 1− ( 1
2
+ 1
2
α). Similarly, when a sell order is received, all
probabilities for V = Vi, Vi < Pb are multiplied by
1
2
+ 1
2
α, and all the
remaining discrete probabilities are multiplied by 1− ( 1
2
+ 1
2
α) before
renormalizing.
These updates lead to less smooth density estimates than the up-
dates for noisy informed traders, as can be seen from figure 2.3 which
shows the density functions 5, 10 and 15 steps after a jump in the un-
derlying value of the stock. The update equations that consider noisy
informed traders serve to smoothly transform the probability distribu-
tion around the last transaction price by a mixture of a Gaussian and
a uniform density, whereas the update equations for perfectly informed
traders discretely shift all probabilities to one side of the transaction
price in one direction and on the other side of the transaction price in
the other direction. The estimates for perfectly informed traders also
tend to be more susceptible to noise, as they do not restrict most of
the mass of the probability density function to as small an area as the
estimates for noisy informed traders.
From figure 2.4 we can see that the market-maker successfully tracks
the true value over the course of an entire simulation. Another inter-
esting feature of the algorithm is that the bid-ask spread reflects the
market-maker’s uncertainty about the true value — for example, it is
typically higher immediately after the true value has jumped.
In the next chapter we present empirical results from applying this
algorithm in different market settings and also extend the basic al-
gorithm for market-making presented here to take into account other
factors like inventory control and profit motive.
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Figure 2.3: The evolution of the market-maker’s probability density
estimate with noisy informed traders (above) and perfectly informed
traders (below)
24
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
x 104
988
990
992
994
996
998
1000
1002
Time Period
Tr
ue
 V
al
ue
 ($
)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
x 104
985
990
995
1000
1005
Time Period
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 V
al
ue
 ($
)
1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900
999.4
999.6
999.8
1000
1000.2
Time Period
Pr
ic
e 
($)
1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
Time Period
Sp
re
ad
 ($
)
True Value
Bid Price
Ask Price
Figure 2.4: The market-maker’s tracking of the true price over the
course of the simulation (left) and immediately before and after a price
jump (right)
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Chapter 3
Inventory Control,
Profit Motive and
Transaction Prices
3.1 A Na¨ive Market-Maker
At this stage, it is necessary to introduce a simple algorithm for market-
making. There are two main reasons to study such an algorithm. First,
it helps to elucidate the effects of some extensions to the main algo-
rithm presented in the last chapter (which we shall sometimes refer to
as the “sophisticated” algorithm), and second, it provides a basis for
comparison. This na¨ive market-maker “surrounds” the last transaction
price with its bid and ask quotes while maintaining a fixed spread at
all times. At the first time period, the market-maker knows the initial
true value and sets its bid and ask quotes around that price. So, for
example, if the last transaction price was Ph and the market-maker
uses a fixed spread δ, it would set its bid and ask quotes at Ph−
δ
2
and
Ph +
δ
2
respectively.
Given that we do not consider transaction sizes in this thesis, the
above algorithm is actually surprisingly effective for market-making, as
it adjusts its prices upwards or downwards depending on the kinds of
orders entering the market. The major problem with the algorithm
is that it is incapable of adjusting its spread to react to market con-
ditions or to competition from other market-makers, so, as we shall
demonstrate, it does not perform as well (relatively speaking) in com-
petitive environments or under volatile market conditions as algorithms
that take market events into account more explicitly.
3.2 Experimental Framework
Unless specified otherwise, it can be assumed that all simulations take
place in a market populated by noisy informed traders and uninformed
traders. The noisy informed traders receive a noisy signal of the true
value of the stock with the noise term being drawn from a Gaussian
distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 5 cents. The standard
deviation of the jump process for the stock is 50 cents, and the proba-
bility of a jump occurring at any time step is 0.005. The market-maker
is informed of when a jump occurs, but not of the size or direction of
the jump. The market-maker uses an inventory control function (de-
fined below) and increases the spread by lowering the bid price and
raising the ask price by a fixed amount (this is done to ensure prof-
itability and is also explained below). We report average results from
50 simulations, each lasting 50,000 time steps.
3.3 Inventory Control
Stoll analyzes dealer costs in conducting transactions and divides them
into three categories [27]. These three categories are portfolio risk,
transaction costs and the cost of asymmetric information. In the model
we have presented so far, following Glosten and Milgrom [15], we have
assumed that transactions have zero execution cost and developed a
pricing mechanism that explicitly attempts to set the spread to account
for the cost of asymmetric information.
A realistic model for market-making necessitates taking portfolio
risk into account as well, and controlling inventory in setting bid and
ask prices. In the absence of consideration of trade size and failure
conditions, portfolio risk should affect the placement of the bid and ask
prices, but not the size of the spread1 [1, 27, 16]. If the market-maker
has a long position in the stock, minimizing portfolio risk is achieved
by lowering both bid and ask prices (effectively making it harder for
the market-maker to buy stock and easier for it to sell stock), and if the
market-maker has a short position, inventory is controlled by raising
both bid and ask prices.
Inventory control can be incorporated into the architecture of our
market-making algorithm by using it as an adjustment parameter ap-
1One would expect spread to increase with the trade size.
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Figure 3.1: Step function for inventory control and the underlying sig-
moid function
MM Type No IC IC
Na¨ive 158.95 7.85
Sophisticated 39.46 8.99
Table 3.1: Average of absolute value of market-maker’s inventory hold-
ings at the end of a simulation
plied after bid and ask prices have been determined by equations 2.10
and 2.11. An example of the kind of function we can use to determine
the amount of the shift is a sigmoid function. The motivation for us-
ing a sigmoid function is to allow for an initial gradual increase in the
impact of inventory control on prices, followed by a steeper increase as
inventory accumulates, while simultaneously bounding the upper limit
by which inventory control can play a factor in price setting. Of course,
the upper bound and slope of the sigmoid can be adjusted according
to the qualities desired in the function.
For our simulations, we use an inventory control function that uses
the floor of a real valued sigmoid function with a ceiling of 5 cents
as the integer price adjustment (in cents). The step function for the
adjustment and the underlying sigmoid are shown in figure 3.1.
Figure 3.2 is a scatter plot that shows the effects of using the above
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Figure 3.2: Na¨ive market-maker profits as a function of market volatil-
ity without (above) and with (below) inventory control
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Figure 3.3: Sophisticated market-maker profits as a function of market
volatility without (above) and with (below) inventory control
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MM Type No IC IC
Na¨ive −0.9470 −0.1736
Sophisticated −0.7786 −0.3452
Table 3.2: Correlation between market volatility and market-maker
profit for market-makers with and without inventory control
MM Type No IC IC
Na¨ive −0.1672 −0.1033
Sophisticated 0.8372 0.8454
Table 3.3: Average profit (in cents per time period) for market-makers
with and without inventory control
inventory control function for a na¨ive market-maker using a δ value of
8 cents (note that the Y axes are on different scales for the two parts of
the figure). Figure 3.3 shows the effects for a market-maker using the
sophisticated algorithm2. Table 3.1 shows the average absolute value of
inventory held by the market-maker at the end of each simulation for
the different cases. The figures use the absolute value of the difference
between last true value and initial true value as a proxy for estimating
market volatility, as this difference provides a measure of how much
a large inventory could affect profit for a particular simulation. 500
simulations were run for each experiment, and 70% of the traders were
noisy informed traders, while the rest were uninformed.
The results in figures 3.2 and 3.3 and tables 3.2 and 3.3 demon-
strate that without inventory control, market-maker profits are highly
correlated with volatility, and the inventory control module we have
suggested successfully removes the dependence of profit on volatility
without reducing expected profit. The differences in profit for the
inventory control and no inventory control cases are not statistically
significant for either the na¨ive or the sophisticated market-maker. In
fact, it is somewhat surprising that average profit is not reduced by
inventory control, since adding inventory control is similar to adding
additional constraints to an optimization problem. This effect could be
2For this experiment, the market-maker was modified to increase the spread
beyond the zero profit condition by lowering the bid price by 3 cents and increasing
the ask price by 3 cents. The motivation for this is to use a profitable market-maker,
as will become clear in the next section, and to perform a fair comparison with a
na¨ive market-maker that uses a fixed spread of 8 cents.
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due to the fact that our algorithm is not in fact performing exact opti-
mization, and the inventory control module may help to adjust prices
in the correct direction in volatile markets. Another interesting fact
is that the sophisticated market-making algorithm is less susceptible
to the huge losses that the na¨ive market-maker incurs in very volatile
market environments, even without inventory control. This suggests
that the sophisticated algorithm is adapting to different environments
more successfully than the na¨ive algorithm.
3.4 Profit Motive
The zero-profit condition of Glosten and Milgrom is expected from
game theoretic considerations when multiple competitive dealers are
making markets in the same stock. However, since our method is an
approximation scheme, the zero profit method is unlikely to truly be
zero-profit. Further, the market-maker is not always in a perfectly
competitive scenario where it needs to restrict the spread as much as
possible. In this section, we investigate some possibilities for increas-
ing the spread to ensure profitability conditions for the market-making
algorithm.
3.4.1 Increasing the Spread
The simplest solution to the problem of making profit is to increase
the spread by pushing the bid and ask prices apart after the zero-
profit bid and ask prices have been computed using the density estimate
obtained by the market-making algorithm. The major effect of this on
the density estimation technique is that the signals the market-maker
receives and uses to update its density estimate are determined by
transaction prices, which are in turn determined by the bid and ask
prices the market-maker has set. The precise values of the bid and ask
prices are quite important to the sampling of the distribution on trades
induced by the true value.
Figure 3.4 shows the profit obtained by a single monopolistic
market-maker in markets with different percentages of noisy informed
traders. The numbers on the X axis show the amount (in cents) that
is subtracted from (added to) the zero-profit bid (ask) price in order to
push the spread apart (we will refer to this number as the shift factor).
It is important to note that market-makers can make reasonable profits
with low average spreads – an example is given at the end of the section
on competitive market-making.
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Figure 3.4: Market-maker profits as a function of increasing the spread
With lower spreads, most of the market-maker’s profits come from
the noise factor of the informed traders, whereas with a higher spread,
most of the market-maker’s profits come from the trades of uninformed
traders. Different percentages of informed traders lead to differently
shaped curves. With only 50% of the traders being informed, the
market-maker’s profit keeps increasing with the size of the spread. How-
ever, increasing the spread beyond a point is counterproductive if there
are enough noisy informed traders in the markets, because then the
market-maker’s prices are far enough away from the true value that
even the noise factor cannot influence the informed traders to make
trades. With 90% of the traders being informed, a global maximum
(at least for reasonable spreads) is attained with a low spread, while
with 70% of the traders being informed, a local maximum is attained
with a fairly low spread, although the larger number of uninformed
traders allows for larger profits with rather large spreads.
Another point worth mentioning is that the market-maker’s proba-
bility density estimates tend to be more concentrated with more noisy
informed traders in the markets, because each trade provides more in-
formation. This leads to the empirical results being closer to theoretical
predictions. For example, the prices leading to zero profit for the 70%
informed and 90% informed cases fall between the 0 and 1 points on
the X axis, which is close to what one would expect from the the-
ory, whereas with perfectly informed traders zero profit is not obtained
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Figure 3.5: Market-maker profits with noisy informed traders and per-
fectly informed traders
without using a large spread.
Figure 3.5 compares the profits obtained by the market-maker with
70% noisy informed traders as opposed to 70% perfectly informed
traders. In the latter case, there is no advantage to be gained by having
a smaller spread as there is with noisy informed traders. However, the
market-maker’s inability to make any profit even with a high spread
seems surprising. This is partly attributable to the fact that the point
at which the distribution is sampled is more important in the perfectly
informed case because the signals only inform the market-maker of the
probabilities that the true value is greater than or less than the last
transaction price, instead of smoothly morphing points around the last
transaction price by a mixture of a Gaussian distribution and a uniform
distribution.
3.4.2 Active Learning
The above observation on how the smoothing effect of noisy informed
traders on the posterior distribution helps to maintain, in some senses,
a “good” density estimate points us in an interesting direction for the
case of perfectly informed traders. We can see from figure 3.5 that,
counterintuitively, profits increase slowly with increasing spread. Since
the market-maker sets “controls” at Pb and Pa, it may not be getting
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Bid/Ask Adjustment Perfectly Informed Noisy Informed
4 -0.7382 0.8075
4r -0.5119 0.5594
Table 3.4: Average profit (in cents per time period) for market-makers
with and without randomization in the sampling strategy
“good” samples for estimating the probability density for values in the
region between Pb and Pa, which is the most important part of the
distribution, since the true value probably lies in that range.
One way of dealing with this problem is to occasionally sample from
the distribution between Pb and Pa by not increasing the spread and
just using the zero-profit condition prices some percentage of the time.
We tested the effectiveness of this method in markets with informed
traders constituting 50% of the trading crowd, and the market-maker
decreasing the bid price and increasing the ask price by 4 cents. In the
randomized case, the market-maker increased the spread 60% of the
time, leaving it untouched otherwise. The results from this experiment
are shown in table 3.4.
“4r” represents the randomized algorithm, and we can see that it
outperforms the non-randomized version (in fact, it also outperforms
versions that use higher spreads) in markets with perfectly informed
traders. The same does not hold true for markets with noisy informed
traders, where the loss incurred by not pushing the spread up at each
opportunity dominates any benefits gained from improving the den-
sity estimate. This is because of the smoother nature of the noisy
estimate, as discussed above. There may be an interesting connection
between this behavior and the “exploration-exploitation” tradeoff as
thought of in reinforcement learning [28] — a market-maker willing to
sacrifice profits temporarily in order to improve its estimate can make
more profit in the long term. The online nature of the problem decrees
that the probability of sampling more aggressively by not increasing
the spread cannot be smoothly decreased over time, but perhaps more
sophisticated algorithms for sampling the important areas of the dis-
tribution might help performance even more in terms of profit in the
perfectly informed case. Perhaps some of the ideas for sampling from
the distribution more effectively can be adapted to the noisy case. This
is an interesting direction for future work.
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3.4.3 Competitive Market-Making
The most important aspect of competitive market-making within the
framework in which we view it is that market-makers are not guaran-
teed to execute trades just by being in the market. Instead the highest
bid price quoted by any market-maker and the lowest ask price quoted
by any market-maker become the effective market bid-ask quotes, and
the market-makers compete with each other for trades. A market-
maker who does not make a sufficient number of trades will lose out to
a market-maker who makes substantially more trades even if the latter
makes less profit per trade.
This effect is particularly obvious in the first experiment shown in
table 3.5. In this experiment, two market-makers who both use the
market-making algorithm presented in this thesis compete with each
other, with the difference that one uses a shift factor of 2 and the
other a shift factor of 3 for increasing the spread after the zero-profit
bid and ask prices have been determined. If neither were using an
inventory control mechanism, the market-maker using a shift factor of
3 would in fact make no trades, because the market-maker using a shift
factor of 2 would always have the inside quotes for both the bid and
the ask. The addition of inventory control allows the market-maker
using a shift factor of 3 to make some trades, but this market-maker
makes considerably less profit than the one using a shift factor of 2.
In a monopolistic environment the market-maker using a shift factor
of 3 outperforms the market-maker using a shift factor of 2 and the
difference in magnitude of executed trades is not as large.
It is interesting to compare two different strategies for market-
making in competitive and monopolistic environments. The na¨ive
market-making algorithm outperforms the sophisticated algorithm in
a monopolistic framework with 70% of the traders being perfectly in-
formed and the rest uninformed. However, it is outperformed by the
sophisticated algorithm in the same environment when they are in di-
rect competition with each other. Although both are incurring losses,
the sophisticated algorithm is making more trades than the na¨ive algo-
rithm under competition, so the improved performance is not a function
of simply not making trades. This is the third experiment reported in
table 3.5. The second experiment in table 3.5 shows the performance of
the two algorithms with 70% of the trading crowd consisting of noisy in-
formed traders and the remaining 30% consisting of uninformed traders.
Again, the presence of competition severely degrades the na¨ive market-
maker’s performance without significantly hurting the sophisticated
market-maker. This suggests that our algorithm for market-making
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70% noisy informed traders
Competitive Monopolistic
MM Type Profit # Trades Profit # Trades
Soph (shift = 2) 0.6039 38830 0.6216 39464
Soph (shift = 3) 0.0157 594 0.8655 34873
70% noisy informed traders
Competitive Monopolistic
MM Type Profit # Trades Profit # Trades
Naive (spread = 8) -0.8020 17506 -0.0840 35176
Soph (shift = 3) 0.7687 20341 0.8655 34873
70% perfectly informed traders
Competitive Monopolistic
MM Type Profit # Trades Profit # Trades
Naive (spread = 8) -0.9628 12138 -0.5881 23271
Soph (shift = 3) -0.6379 16331 -0.8422 27581
Table 3.5: Market-maker profits (in cents per time period) and average
number of trades in simulations lasting 50,000 time steps in monopo-
listic and competitive environments
is robust with respect to competition.
For a market with 70% of the trading crowd consisting of noisy in-
formed traders and the remaining 30% consisting of uninformed traders,
our algorithm, using inventory control and a shift factor of 1, achieves
an average profit of 0.0074± 0.0369 cents per time period with an av-
erage spread of 2.2934 ± 0.0013 cents. These parameter settings in
this environment yield a market-maker that is close to a Nash equilib-
rium player, and it is exceedingly unlikely that any algorithm would
be able to outperform this one in direct competition in such an envi-
ronment given the low spread. It would be interesting to compare the
performance of other sophisticated market-making algorithms to this
one in competitive scenarios. Another interesting avenue to explore is
the possibility of adaptively changing the shift factor depending on the
level of competition in the market. Clearly, in a monopolistic setting, a
market-maker is better off using a high shift factor, whereas in a com-
petitive setting it is likely to be more successful using a smaller one.
An algorithm for changing the shift factor based on the history of other
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σ Shift Spread Profit
100 1 2.7366 -0.7141
100 2 5.0601 -0.1410
50 1 2.2934 0.0074
50 2 4.4466 0.6411
Table 3.6: Market-maker average spreads (in cents) and profits (in cents
per time period) as a function of the standard deviation of the jump
process
p Shift Spread Profit
0.005 1 2.2934 0.0074
0.005 2 4.4466 0.6411
0.0001 1 2.0086 0.8269
0.0001 2 4.0154 1.4988
Table 3.7: Market-maker average spreads (in cents) and profits (in cents
per time period) as a function of the probability of a jump occurring
at any point in time
market-makers’ quotes would be a useful addition.
3.5 The Effects of Volatility
Volatility of the underlying true value process is affected by two pa-
rameters. One is the standard deviation of the jump process, which
affects the variability in the amount of each jump. The other is the
probability with which a jump occurs. Table 3.6 shows the result of
changing the standard deviation σ of the jump process and table 3.7
shows the result of changing the probability p of a jump occurring at
any point in time. As expected, the spread increases with increased
volatility, and profit decreases. A higher average spread needs to be
maintained to get the same profit in more volatile markets.
3.6 Accounting for Jumps
The great advantage of our algorithm for density estimation and price
setting is that it quickly restricts most of the probability mass to a
relatively small region of values/prices, which allows the market-maker
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to quote a small spread and still break even or make profit. The other
side of this equation is that once the probability mass is concentrated
in one area, the probability density function on other points in the
space becomes vanishingly small. In some cases, it is not possible to
seamlessly update the estimate through the same process if a price jump
occurs. Another problem is that a sequence of jumps could lead to
the value leaving the [−4σ, 4σ] window used by the density estimation
technique3.
If the market-maker is in some way explicitly informed of when
a price jump has occurred (perhaps the market-maker gets a signal
whenever news arrives or may have arrived, like right before an earnings
report is released), although not of the size or direction of the jump,
the problem can be solved by recentering the distribution around the
current expected value and reinitializing in the same way in which the
prior distribution on the value is initially set up. In the “unknown
jump” case the problem is more complicated. We tested certain simple
rules relating to order imbalance which utilize the fact that the cost of
not recentering when a jump has occurred is significantly higher than
the cost of recentering if a jump has not occurred. An example of such
a rule is to recenter when there have been k more buy orders than
sell orders (or vice versa) in the last n time steps. Table 3.8 shows
the results obtained using different n and k values, where the loss of
the expectation is defined as the average of the absolute value of the
difference between the true value and the market-maker’s expectation of
the true value at each point in time. Clearly there is a tradeoff between
recentering too often and not recentering often enough. Although there
is a loss to be incurred by waiting for too long after a price jump to
recenter, it can be even worse to recenter too aggressively (such as the
n = 5, k = 3 case). An interesting avenue for future work, especially if
trade sizes are incorporated into the model, is to devise a classifier that
is good at predicting when a price jump has occurred. Perhaps there are
particular types of trades that commonly occur following price jumps,
especially when limit orders and differing trade sizes are permitted.
Sequences of such trades may form patterns that predict the occurrence
of jumps in the underlying value.
3For cases with perfectly informed traders the first of these problems is typically
not critical, but since the probabilities away from the expected value still represent
a significant probability mass, estimates can become degraded if the expected value
is sufficiently skewed away from the mean.
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n k Profit Loss of expectation
Known 0.8259 4.2261
10 5 0.2327 5.5484
10 6 0.3069 5.1544
10 7 0.2678 5.3254
5 3 -0.4892 6.8620
Table 3.8: Average profit (in cents per time period) and loss of expec-
tation for market-makers using different parameters for recentering the
probability distribution
3.7 Time Series Properties of Transaction
Prices
Liu et al present a detailed analysis of the time series properties of
returns in a real equity market (they focus on the S&P 500 and compo-
nent stocks) [19]. Their major findings are that return distributions are
leptokurtic and fat-tailed, volatility clustering occurs (that is, big price
changes are more likely to be followed by big price changes and small
price changes are more likely to be followed by small price changes)4 and
that the autocorrelation of absolute values of returns decays according
to a power law, and is persistent over large time scales, as opposed to
the autocorrelation of raw returns, which disappears rapidly.
Raberto et al are able to replicate the fat tailed nature of the dis-
tribution of returns and the clustered volatility observed in real mar-
kets [25]. However, the Genoa Artificial Stock Market explicitly models
opinion propagation and herd behavior among trading agents in a way
that we do not5. Nevertheless, our model is also able to replicate the
important stylized facts of real financial time series, including the lep-
tokurtic distribution of returns, clustered volatility and persistence of
the autocorrelation of absolute returns.
A return over a particular time period is defined as the ratio of
the prices at which two transactions occur which are separated by that
period in time. In our model, a one step return is the ratio of the prices
4Liu et al are certainly not the first to discover these properties of financial
time series. However, they summarize much of the work in an appropriate fashion
and provide detailed references, and they present novel results on the power law
distribution of volatility correlation.
5A jump in the true value will lead informed traders in our model to make the
same decisions on whether to buy or sell, but not because of imitative behavior
among the agents themselves.
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Figure 3.6: Standardized log returns over time
at which two successive transactions occur. We record all transaction
prices and assume that the intervals between transactions are the same.
All experiments in this section are in a market with 70% noisy informed
traders, 30% uninformed traders, and a market-maker using a shift
factor of 1 (which results in the market-maker’s profit being close to
zero). We work with log returns in this model, where the log return is
log Pn+1 − log Pn. Figure 3.6 shows the standardized log returns over
time. Standardized log returns are log returns detrended by the mean
and rescaled by the standard deviation. The clustering of volatility and
the sharp tails are evident from figure 3.6. Figure 3.7 demonstrates the
leptokurtic nature of the distribution of returns. The fat tail is evident
from the right half of the graph, where the area being covered by the
distribution of returns “pokes out” from the area covered by a normal
distribution. The kurtosis for this experiment was 28.7237.
The other important features of real financial time series that our
market also shows are the long-range persistence of the autocorrela-
tion of absolute returns and the clustering of volatility (figure 3.8 and
figure 3.6 respectively). Interestingly, the decay of autocorrelation ap-
pears to be linear, which is in contrast with the power law decay ob-
served by Liu et al. If we look more closely, the decay is linear on a
log-log scale for the first 25 lags (indicative of a power law decay) (fig-
ure 3.9). The long range persistence of autocorrelation is an important
feature of real financial markets [19], but in comparison, Raberto et
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Figure 3.7: Leptokurtic distribution of absolute standardized log re-
turns
al fail to observe persistence of autocorrelation beyond 80 lags in the
Genoa market, and they do not see decay consistent with a power law
at any scale. Real markets, the Genoa market and our artificial market
all show quick decay of the autocorrelation of raw returns (figure 3.10).
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Figure 3.9: Autocorrelation of absolute returns on a log-log scale for
lags of 1-100
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Figure 3.10: Autocorrelation of raw returns
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Chapter 4
Conclusions and Future
Work
4.1 Summary
The major contribution of this thesis is the presentation of an algo-
rithm for market-making under conditions of asymmetric information
in markets with informed and uninformed traders. Glosten and Mil-
grom derive the basic concept of setting bid and ask prices to be the
conditional expectations of the true value given that a sell or buy order
is received, but do not extend the concept beyond toy problems [15].
On the other side of the spectrum, Chan and Shelton develop a rein-
forcement learning algorithm for market-making that is fairly complex
and attempts to deal with multiple objectives like profit and inventory
control simultaneously, but needs many training episodes and has a
hard time approaching profitability, even in markets simpler than the
ones we study here [6]. The price setting equations of our market-
making algorithm are theoretically grounded in the work of Glosten
and Milgrom, and the density estimation technique is essentially ex-
plicit Bayesian learning. Modules for inventory control and for increas-
ing profit by increasing the spread can be added to the algorithm after
solution of the expected value equations for price-setting.
Our market-making algorithm displays many qualities that one
would expect from any reasonable market-maker. It increases the
spread when it is more uncertain about the true value (for example, fol-
lowing a jump in the underlying value) and tends to maintain a higher
spread in more volatile markets. Our market-maker also allows us to
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gain insights into the structure of simple markets. For example, in
markets with large numbers of noisy informed traders, increasing the
spread is counterproductive beyond a point even in the absence of com-
petition because it no longer allows the market-maker to make profits
from the errant estimates of the noisy informed traders. In competitive
dealer markets, as one would expect, market-makers who execute more
trades tend to benefit even if they make less profit per trade, because
their quotes are on the inside more often.
Simple artificial markets populated by the kinds of trading crowds
and market-makers we describe are capable of replicating some of the
important time series phenomena of real financial markets. For exam-
ple, the leptokurtic distribution of returns and the persistence of the
autocorrelation of absolute returns along with the rapid decay of the
autocorrelation of raw returns are important phenomena in financial
time series [19]. These phenomena are replicated to some extent in the
artificial markets described by Lux [20] and Raberto et al [25] among
others, but only with explicit models of opinion propagation and evo-
lutionary behavior in the trading crowd. The fact that our model does
not need to postulate such behavior, instead relying on the simple in-
teraction between informed and uninformed traders, may point to an
important underlying regularity of such time series phenomena.
In terms of learning, this thesis describes a nonparametric density
estimation algorithm that is very successful in the application domain.
The importance of smoothness of the density function for good perfor-
mance is demonstrated by the far superior performance of the algorithm
with noisy informed traders (it is worth noting that the gains are not
primarily from the noise itself, but are mostly due to the improved es-
timation – using the perfectly informed estimates with noisy informed
traders does not lead to performance as good as that achieved using
the noisy estimates). The importance of maintaining a good estimate
rather than just increasing the spread is apparent from the success
of the “active learning” algorithm that aggressively samples from the
distribution in the perfectly informed case.
4.2 Future Directions
Deriving a model for market-making is just a starting point for much
exciting research in agent-based modeling of financial markets. The
research directions we believe to be particularly interesting in this re-
gard are focused on the learning aspects and on creating richer market
models.
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We have briefly touched on how active learning can be used to im-
prove the density estimate and hence the performance of the market-
making algorithm. However, the method we present is na¨ive and has
not been studied in depth. It would be worthwhile to investigate how
to sample the distribution to achieve the best estimate possible while
still maintaining a high enough spread to achieve profit. This is partic-
ularly interesting in the competitive framework where an agent cannot
compensate for loss at one time by raising the spread exorbitantly at
another.
Perhaps the most interesting issues will arise in the context of multi-
agent learning. One point of departure is to consider the shift factor
and have competitive market-makers using the same basic algorithm
try to learn the optimal shift factor to use when competing against
each other. It is conceivable that this could give rise to cooperative (or
collusive) behavior without the need for explicit communication.
The method of dealing with changes in the underlying value pre-
sented in chapter 3 is simplistic. Perhaps it is possible to learn a classi-
fier either online or oﬄine that predicts when a jump has occurred (or
when the probability of a jump having occurred is high enough to war-
rant the cost of recentering the distribution). Lastly in terms of learn-
ing, our model makes many assumptions about the market-maker being
aware of certain parameters like the percentage of informed traders and
the standard deviations of the jump process and the noise terms. What
if the market-maker had to estimate these instead of knowing them up-
front1?
There are also some fascinating directions for future work in terms
of the market structure and model. Among these is more detailed ex-
amination of the time series properties of returns and an analysis of
why they differ from real markets in the characteristics in which they
do differ. We are also interested in calibrating the artificial market pa-
rameters to real markets. For example, the probability of a jump or the
standard deviation of the jump could be usefully linked to occurrences
in real markets. This would give more meaning to the precise val-
ues derived from the experimental results, like market-maker bid-ask
spreads. Finally, it is important to investigate richer, more complex
market-models. The first step in this direction is to incorporate con-
sideration of different trade sizes. Following this, we would also like to
explore markets with different types of traders, including traders who
are capable of placing limit orders.
1In preliminary experiments, the profitability and low spread seem fairly robust
to the market-maker using a wrong estimate of the number of informed traders, or
of the variance of the noise factor.
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